The record of gender policies in Greece 1980-2010: legal form and economic substance by Lyberaki, Antigone
 All views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not  
necessarily represent the views of the Hellenic Observatory or the LSE 
 
© Antigone Lyberaki 
 
 
 
 
The Record of Gender Policies in Greece 1980-
2010: legal form and economic substance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Antigone Lyberaki 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GreeSE Paper No 36 
 
Hellenic Observatory Papers on Greece and Southeast Europe 
 
 
 
June 2010 
 
  
 
_
 
Table of Contents 
 
ABSTRACT _______________________________________________________ iii 
1. Introduction: Assessing ‘Legalistic Formalism’ __________________________1 
2. The Greek record to date: Success or failure? ____________________________4 
3. A failure of effort?  ‘A Simple Quantity Theory of Law’ ___________________12 
4. Explanation: Why were good intentions thwarted? _______________________19 
5. Conclusions: The perils of legalistic formalism __________________________31 
References _________________________________________________________35 
 
 
                                                 
Acknowledgements 
The author wishes to acknowledge valuable insights gleaned from discussions with: Anna Frangoudaki, 
Nicos Mouzelis, Chryssi Inglessi, Athina Petroglou, Tasos Giannitsis, Manos Matsaganis and Platon 
Tinios. An earlier version was presented at the International Association for Feminist Economics 
Conference 2009. 
 
  
 
 
The Record of Gender Policies in Greece 1980-2010: legal form 
and economic substance 
 
Antigone Lyberaki# 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Reforms promoting gender equality in Greece are held by many to be 
one of the few real success stories of the post-1974 period. Indeed, 
there has been considerable activity in changes in employment, 
family, social insurance and other legislation all centered around the 
constitutional provision on equal treatment which came into force in 
1983.  This activism, however, was mainly about statutory changes 
and lacked a feminist analysis of women’s real position in the Greek 
economy and society. The main argument of the paper is that gender 
equality-promoting policies, laws and measures - ‘Legalistic 
Formalism’- failed because they ignored the dual nature of the 
labour market and the economics of the family. By focusing on legal 
form and ignoring reality it allowed the reform momentum to be 
hijacked. 
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The Record of Gender Policies in Greece 1980-2010: legal form 
and economic substance 
 
1. Introduction: Assessing ‘Legalistic Formalism’ 
Policies for gender balance were copious in Greece after 1974. Some, at least, 
are widely acknowledged as “success stories” (family law, maternity protection 
in work, abortion, but also promotion of equality in education). In a -
supposedly- highly resistant country to ‘reforms’, progress in gender equality is 
often deemed to be a shining exception1. When looking at outcomes, however, 
the picture appears more ambivalent: employment participation rates are low 
by European standards and improve slower than in other Mediterranean 
countries. Unemployment rates are much higher than men’s. Incomes from 
employment are lower, due to occupational segregation but also to the “glass 
ceiling” restricting promotions. The representation of women in the political 
system is still lagging and tokenism rife.  
The contrast between the complacent and self-congratulatory assessment and 
the equivocal reality is the starting point of this paper. Greece can be seen as 
typical of the countries on the “European rim”, especially Southern European, 
where “Europeanization” was a key process in the mechanism of social change 
(Sotiropoulos 2009; Featherstone 2005). In such cases, the forces usually 
associated with globalisation are aided by a largely imported discourse on 
modernisation and institutional change. Formalism in the sense of an emphasis 
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 See Featherstone (2005); Monastiriotis and Antoniades (2009); Sotiropoulos (2009); Hatzis and 
Nalpantidou (2009). 
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on outward signs and legal detail, has been early on seen by Mouzelis 1978 as a 
symptom of conflict between imported and indigenous ideas and institutions. 
Gender equality in a society characterised by conservative values, is a case in 
point. Thirty years after Mouzelis’ observation, gender rhetoric is firmly 
entrenched as part of political correctness at the same time as all gender 
balance indicators lag clearly behind.  
The structure of the paper follows the logic of the argument. The second 
section employs a broad brush, to reinterpret the success or failure of policy 
interventions on gender. It offers an alternative –and far more critical – account 
of developments placing emphasis on deficits relative to what could, or should, 
have been achieved. The new narrative rejects the legalistic approach that 
deems a problem ‘solved’ once a law has been passed; instead, it examines 
outcomes in the light of the feminist analysis on the economics of the family 
and the labour market (Bettio & Villa, 1996; Estevez-Abe, Iversen & Soskice, 
2001). 
To explain a shortfall in performance, a simpleminded reading may be that 
legislation has not proceeded far enough. An overview of the Greek case in the 
third section shows that, on the contrary, legislation has, at least in quantity, not 
been lacking; that a number of institutions focusing on gender equality have 
operated for over two decades; and that the rhetoric of gender equality is well 
entrenched in the political discourse of most actors in Greece. Thus, what may 
be called ‘A simple quantity theory of law’, i.e. that there was a failure in 
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legislative effort, is not sufficient to describe reality. Instead the paper explores 
the operation of what it terms ‘Greek legalistic formalism’; this in the gender 
context, would amount to a pursuit through legal means of an undifferentiated 
objective named ‘gender equality’. This sets the scene for the main question to 
be explained: why did the gender gaps persist despite institutional and legal 
activism? 
This paper attempts to explain the paradox of thwarted good intentions by 
offering interpretations grounded in the features of Greece as a Mediterranean 
society with a large, family-run small business sector and an overblown, yet 
ineffective, public sector. It examines the validity of three hypotheses: (1) that 
reforms were only applied to the public sector, (2) that gender equality was 
resisted in the private sector due to costs and the prevailing values, and last, (3) 
that women, in order to benefit from ‘special provisions’, were encouraged to 
adopt, in practice, the view that their economic role was subordinate to their 
primary (family-based) responsibilities. The explanations derived on the basis 
of these three hypotheses, do not ascribe the persistence of gender imbalances 
to incidental chance factors, nor do they portray them as evidence of a 
pervasive male conspiracy. Yet, they explain the paradox as an example of 
possibly good intentions clashing head-on with an insufficient analysis of the 
situation. The uneven implementation of gender legislation incorporated 
equality of gender treatment in the public sector as an element of the pre-
existing insider/outsider divide, and thus was instrumental as a factor impeding 
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meaningful change - if the criterion used is the overall outcome for the majority 
of women.  
The core argument is that gender equality-promoting policies, laws and 
measures - ‘Legalistic Formalism’- failed because they ignored the dual nature 
of the labour market and the economics of the family. In the absence of a 
robust gendered economic analysis, the legalistic culture has complicated the 
picture further. By focusing on legal form and ignoring reality it allowed 
gender legislation to be appropriated as a weapon to maintain the position of 
the relatively protected and privileged groups to the detriment of the most 
vulnerable in the insider/outsider divide. In this manner, the reform momentum 
was effectively hijacked. Thus, legalistic formalism was content to create an 
imagined sphere where gender equality could be proclaimed and defended, and 
where good intentions could be prominently displayed. 
 
2. The Greek record to date: Success or failure? 
What is the current state of gender equality in Greece? How does it compare 
with what it used to be? Equally, how does it compare with what happened in 
countries of similar starting points –what it could have been? The answer to 
these two questions will determine the nature of the issue to be discussed. Can 
the experience of Greece over the last two decades and a half be judged a 
success or be lamented as an example of failure? 
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The analysis takes a long and necessarily impressionistic view, in order to 
identify key changes. It focuses initially on change on education, employment 
and wages. 
Compared to the situation pertaining a generation ago, there can be no denying 
that there has been important change. This change is especially evident in two 
key fields2:  
• In education the percentage of women 25-64 having completed secondary 
education amongst the population almost doubled in the 15 years since 
1992.  The figures for tertiary education are even more impressive – women 
actually overtake men after 2001. Education is important both in itself and 
due to its second-order effects on career choice, attitudes etc.  
• In employment, female employment is the fastest growing part of total 
employment3, from 34% in 1985 (Figure 1a) to 39% in 2006 (Figure 1b). 
However, most of the increase was absorbed by the Government sector 
(public=central government + local authorities, including also public 
enterprises). 
• In wages, the trends suggest that there has been some improvement in the 
raw gender pay gap (pay gap in unadjusted form: Commission of the 
European Communities, 2008) over the years, though the econometric 
evidence on discrimination remains robust and more or less unchanged 
                                                 
2
 Lyberaki (2009) covers the same empirical ground more thoroughly. 
3
 Between 1992 and 2000 a million immigrant workers (who were predominantly male) were added to 
the labour force. Thus the increase in the share of women among the indigenous employed population 
is understated by the data. 
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(Kanellopoulos et al, 2003, Cholezas & Tsakloglou, 2006, Papapetrou, 
2004).  
• In politics, the percentage of women in the Greek Parliament is somewhere 
between 10% and 15%, low by European standards and clearly lower than 
the percentage of women managers (25%).  
These developments complement a generalised picture of greater involvement 
by women in economic, social and political life (National Centre for Social 
Research, 2007). 
Figure 1a Composition of wage employment by gender and sector, Greece 1985. 
Total 1985                                              Women 1985
986; 
27%
248,1; 
7%
495,2; 
14%
1860,7; 
52%
1234,1; 
34%
men, private men, public women, public women, private
 
Source: ILO, Labor Statistics 
Can we interpret the Greek experience of the last generation as a success story? 
After all, the changes just surveyed are unprecedented in historical terms. On 
this basis, policy makers feel justified in being self-congratulatory, interpreting 
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the picture as a trailblazing remoulding of society (PASOK –the Greek 
Socialist Party- 2000)4.  
Figure 1b Composition of wage employment by gender and sector, Greece 2006 
Total 2006                                              Women 2006
1297,3;
 29%
429,8; 
10%
1727,1; 
39%
575,1; 
13%
2150,6; 
48%
men, private men, public women, public women, private
 
Source: ILO, Labor Statistics. 
However, sobriety soon returns when one abandons comparing Greece with its 
earlier self and examines its experience against the backdrop of its peers over 
the same period. If we interpret what was happening to other (South) European 
countries as the norm and we use that as the yardstick to judge Greek progress, 
the impression is considerably altered: 
• Figure 2 uses Labour Force Survey data to plot the gender gap in 
employment across the EU in 2001 and 2006, a period when the promotion 
of gender balance was a common and explicit target for all EU states. 
Southern Europe stands out as having by far the largest difference in 
employment rates between men and women. Greece is not only last in the 
European South; it is further distinguished in showing a small improvement 
                                                 
4
 PASOK’s (2000, 63) manifesto for the 2000 election states “In Greece, since 1983, is enforced one of 
the most modern and progressive legislations in the terrain of equality between men and women, both 
in the family and the work-place”. 
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over time. As a result in 2006 it is ranked at the bottom of the EU-15, and 
worse than Italy or Spain.    
Figure 2 Absolute gender gap in employment rates (women and men aged 15-64) 
in EU Member States - 2001 and 2006 
0
10
20
30
40
50
FI SE LT EE DK LV BG SL FR DE RO UK PT HU PL NL AT BE EU27 SK CZ LU IE CY ES IT EL MT
2001 2006
 
Note: Difference between men’s and women’s employment rates. Source: Eurostat, Labour 
Force Survey (LFS) and European Commission 2008 (COM 2008). 
European Union data -along with Eurostat Statistics in Focus (2008, 6) also 
document two further Greek shortfalls in the labour area: 
• In unemployment, where the gender gap in Greece was among the widest in 
2000 (following Spain) and remains so in 2007.  
• The same holds for the proportion of women as managers. This is especially 
damning, given that the large population of very small family-run firms in 
Greece should give a large positive handicap. Nevertheless, Greece secures 
its usual place at the bottom of the EU ranking with little difficulty. 
Before hastening to condemn the Greek record, the point should be answered 
that we ought not to worry about current manifestations of gender imbalances, 
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given that fundamental transformations are occurring below the surface and 
will become apparent in years to come. Thus, gender imbalances in today’s 
Greece are, in this view, merely transitional phenomena, bound to be overcome 
as younger and more educated cohorts of women mature and replace earlier –
and more “traditional”- generations: What we have is a success story, which 
simply has not unravelled fully yet5. 
This optimistic view needs qualification: the differences in employment rates 
between North and South Europe are mostly due to lower participation rates at 
the two opposite ends of the career structure. In the South as compared to the 
North, women enter the labour market later and exit earlier. This behaviour is 
explainable as a feature of Mediterranean family strategy, which characterises 
both older and younger cohorts: young females are kept from high 
unemployment by prolonging education. Women leave work after 50 to care 
for other family members (husbands, parents, grandchildren.)6. This behaviour 
is the rational response to particular incentives embedded in the social 
protection system, as well as other rigidities of the labour market (Lyberaki 
2008b), which largely remain. Once the younger cohorts reach the age at which 
these incentives operate, they are likely to behave in a similar way to their 
predecessors. Thus, in this view, we may expect disadvantage to shrink, but by 
no means to disappear. 
                                                 
5
 For an empirical analysis of cohort effects in female labour participation, see Nicolitsas (2006). 
Lyberaki (2010a) examines the overall argument more fully. 
6
 See below, as also argued by Bettio and Villa (1998). Gender employment gaps are especially wide 
for individuals aged 55-64 and the improvement in Greece over time is non-existent. 
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To pass judgement on policy initiatives on gender equality, one must have a 
view of what would have happened in their absence – a ‘No policy scenario’: 
what we are observing may simply be due to secular changes that are due to 
other factors. This touches on larger (and as yet not settled) issues such as 
whether the transformation due to globalisation over the last 30 years 
strengthens the position of women or not. (e.g. Kabeer et al. 2008; Van 
Staveren et al. 2007).  
Nevertheless, over and above the general trends, one must take into account a 
specifically Greek social transformation process: At the outset of the period, 
Greece was characterised by small family enterprises, both farms and small 
businesses. In this environment the patriarchal prerogative extended to family 
and economic activity. In the 1960s the most common form of female 
employment was as unpaid helpers in a family business (Freris 1986). The 
secular trends towards reducing employment in these sectors would have 
pushed developments in the direction of reducing patriarchal authority –even in 
the absence of policy. The rise in service employment and tourism would have 
similar effects. In this interpretation, structural change could account for the 
direction of movement towards greater equality, weakening the case for the 
efficacy of policy intervention further.  
To sum up, the ‘naked-eye’ evidence on gender equality in Greece certainly 
suggests significant transformations compared to earlier times. If we stand 
these successes against what happened in countries of similar starting points, or 
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even what would have happened anyway, the room for celebration is reduced: 
under these interpretations, matters could have been much better. 
Were gender interventions between 1980 and 2009 overall a success, or a 
failure? Is the dominant image that of reforms giving fruit or of the resistance 
to change? The verdict depends on our choice of benchmark. The choice is not 
value neutral and would follow from our view of the status of gender balance 
as a policy objective. In ascending order of ambition, this section has reviewed 
four separate benchmarks: 
1. Success relative to the past, possibly stored up in the form of a cohort effect 
to appear gradually. What happened in fact. 
2. Success relative to a “no-policy” scenario, in the context of globalisation or 
the Greek enterprise structure. What would have happened, anyway.7 
3. Success relative to what happened to other peer countries; hence the 
benchmark includes some policy effort. What happened in other similar 
countries. 
4. And last and most ambitious is the benchmark of what should happen, 
based on a feminist analysis of woman’s place in society. What should have 
happened.8 
                                                 
7
 This is obviously a tricky issue. Although a number of forces in the terrain of demand would push in 
the direction of higher female participation rates, “higher demand nowhere automatically provokes 
increased supply… (The decision of women to work is not exclusively) framed within a perspective of 
self-interest. Such a decision is governed by a complex series of factors that extend beyond individual 
choice to embrace key sets of societal relationships” as Daly (2000, 467) succinctly put it. Women’s 
work is embedded in the balance of responsibilities between the   State, market and family in terms of 
the distribution of resources and in relation to the provision of care. 
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The impressionistic survey of evidence concludes Greece has been a success 
only if one uses the first and least ambitious criterion of success. A feminist, 
unabashedly using normative criteria, would almost certainly go for a version 
of the last benchmark, and would conclude the opposite. A pragmatic stance for 
a small open economy in the periphery of the advanced world, may utilise the 
record of peers as a “proxy- benchmark” to allow the argument to move 
forward. 
So, Greece is not the trailblazing reformer that some politicians claim. It could 
be that policies have simply been ineffective, or that the problem was far too 
challenging, or even that reformers were ‘turning a blind eye’ (to borrow the 
term from Basu et al, 2007) to employers resisting compliance. In any case, the 
question to be settled is ‘why so little?’, rather than ‘why so much?’ 
 
3. A failure of effort?  ‘A Simple Quantity Theory of Law’ 
Was this lack of success (or perhaps relative failure) because Greece invested 
insufficient effort to gender balance? One simple-minded measure of effort 
may be taken to mean attention devoted to gender balance issues by 
Governments and political actors, in the form of legal changes and institutional 
structures. Lack of success would thus be explained simply as quantitative 
                                                                                                                                            
8
 To return to the earlier point, the critical issue is what kind of intervention is capable of changing the 
balance of   State-market-family responsibilities and the arrangements around care, so as to encourage 
greater gender equality. 
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insufficiency of activity and the conclusion would be to propose more activity 
– what may be termed a Simple Quantity Theory of gender equality Law. 
Table 1 attempts to codify the institutional initiatives that were targeted 
primarily or exclusively towards gender equality. The size (especially taking 
account of the incompleteness) of the table, in a sense, is sufficient to answer 
the question. Taking a closer look, the 1975 Constitution contained an explicit 
gender equality clause (article 4, paragraph 2), which was to have been fully 
implemented after a grace period of 8 years9. As a result, in the early 1980s 
there was a flurry of legislative activity in the fields of family law, 
employment, and social protection. In recent years the influence of European 
Legislation in the form of EU directives is playing an increasing and 
increasingly visible role (Stratigaki, 2007; Petroglou, 2005; Moussourou and 
Stratigaki, 2004; Karamessini, 2006; Davaki, 2006). 
A number of institutions with a primary focus on gender equality were added to 
the legal armoury: the Gender Equality General Secretariat, the Research 
institute for Gender Equality Issues, equality sections in Trade Unions and 
Employers’ associations, women’s sections in parties. Gender equality was also 
a favourite EU-funding receptacle, starting from the EC Social Fund initiatives 
in the 1980s. The generous funds available were an important incentive 
                                                 
9
 According to art 166, par1. Then 2001 amendment added par 2, which explicitly allowed positive 
discrimination and stated that the ‘contravention of inequities that exist in practice, especially against 
women, are the responsibility of the   State’ (Caltsoya-Tournaviti 2002). 
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attracting attention to gender issues and were targeted by many projects10. 
Those projects, at the time of their approval, were characterized as ‘pilot 
projects’, experimental or containing innovative ideas; the expectation was that 
they should play an activating role and act as accelerators of social change, by 
generating emulation. EU-funded projects also supplied an incentive for 
individuals and collectivities to convert wholeheartedly to the cause of gender 
balance.11 
                                                 
10
 The European Funds and the activities around them were also important conduits through which 
European and international discourse on gender equality percolated to the normally closed Greek 
intellectual climate (Karamessini 2006). 
11
 For instance, the Public Power Corporation has been financing gender equality seminars in the form 
of a pleasant week-end break for hardened male Trade Unionists and was subsidised by EU funds. 
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Table 1 Formal initiatives with gender equality dimension. 
 Date Description  Effect 
LEGISLATION 
  
Constitution 
1975 –ful 
implementation 
by 1983 
Article 116, 
par 1 
All legal differentiation by gender 
unconstitutional  
1983 Law 1329 
Abolition of patriarchal family laws  (e.g. dowry, 
surnames, parental responsibility replaces 
paternal) 
1982 Law 1250 Civil Law marriage  Family Law 
1986 Law 1609 
Legalisation of abortion  (Cost covered by social 
security 1987) 
1986 Law 1649 Parental leave, child benefits, allowances 
1984 
Law 1483 
1414 
PD183/88 
Equality in industrial relations (paid and unpaid 
maternity leave),  Collective agreements are 
legally binding 
1997 Law 2525 
Extended hours for some kindergartens  and 
primary schools 
Employment 
2006 Law 3488 
Overall framework for equal treatment in 
education, employment and conditions of work 
Social 
security 
1990 
1992 
2002 
1902 
2084 
3029 
Social security laws altering pensions and 
preconditions of retirement 
INSTITUTIONS 
General 
Secretariat 
of Equality  1982 
Foundation in 
Ministry of 
Interior 
‘Design, implementation and monitoring of 
equality related policies in every sphere’ 
KETHI Law 1989; 
started 1994 
Research 
Institute 
 ‘To Coordinate research on gender for the 
promotion of gender equality in employment, 
entrepreneurship, education, decision making, 
social policy, media  
‘Equality 
sections’  Mid-1980s 
in TUS & 
Employers’ 
Monitoring and promoting equality; consulation; 
transmission of good practices 
‘Womens’ 
sections’ Late 1970s 
All political 
parties 
Promote gender equality in party programmes, 
secure interests of women 
EU Funds for gender equality promotion 
European 
Social Funds 
1982-1985 
1986-1990 Projects  Projects for equal opportunities 
‘NOW” 1990 
Holistic 
intervention 
Active policies for equality (women’s careers, 
child care, pre school infra) 
2nd CSF 1994-1999 Funding subsidised hiring of women + affirmative action 
3rd CSF  2000-2006 
mainstreamed 
Funding + Funds earmarked for women 
NAPs 2001- 
Coordination 
+funding 
Implementation and monitoring of action plans 
Gender equality among top 4 priorities 
EQUAL 2000-2006 Funding Pilot projects in labour market 
Judicial decisions 
Local Courts 
1983- with 
increasing 
frequency 
Decisions on 
specific cases 
Throw out as discriminatory gender-specific 
regulations in employment + social protection 
Interpret the constitutional provision 
European 
courts 1990-   
2009 
Equal Pay for 
Equal Work 
Occupation-specific social protection gender 
differences interpreted as part of pay. European 
directives for equal pay applied (most recently for 
civil servants, earlier for PPC) 
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The end result of all this formal activity was to ‘mainstream’ gender equality in 
political rhetoric and political discourse across the political spectrum (with the 
possible exception of the Church of Greece and the Monasteries of Mt 
Athos12). Gender equality is acknowledged by all to be a key target, affirmative 
action and female quotas are widely practiced by parties and political 
correctness entails invoking the contribution of women. Yet, women still 
remain a small minority among elite groups, while the ubiquitous “Equality 
sections” of parties have amounted to female ghettoes (Wahl et al. 2005; 
European Commission 2008).  
At this stage of the argument, we may attempt a definition of what Greek 
legalistic formalism may mean in the context of gender balance. Public actors 
and legislators conceived of ‘Gender Equality’ as a monolithic undifferentiated 
‘thing’, which could (with suitable partitioning) be addressed as an objective by 
a barrage of laws and formal initiatives. As gender equality was primarily seen 
as a legal issue, an approach based on laws and regulations was deemed to be 
appropriate; little or no attention was given neither to an analysis of the social 
and economic background nor to matters of implementation. 
What may be termed ‘Legalistic Formalism’ (as many frustrated social 
scientists can testify) characterises an entire approach to governance. It extends 
the ideas of legal formalism (i.e. the theory that Law is a set of rules and 
principles independent of other political and social institutions) from the 
                                                 
12
 Even then, the Monastic Community has recently allowed the presence of cats of the female 
persuasion in Mt. Athos, which, taking the long view, must be considered a very radical move towards 
gender balance. 
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judicial system, in order to generalise them to governance in general. Thus 
policy makers (many of whom lawyers by profession) tend to see everything as 
a legal issue and consider a social question solved once legislation is passed13. 
Expressed in a variety of ways (non-implementation, ineffectiveness, inertia or 
un-rule of law) there have been many cases where the laws were allowed to 
lapse (Kaltsonis 1998; Pirounakis 1997). Whether this was the result of the   
State being “a colossus with feet of clay” (Sotiropoulos 1993; Mouzelis 1978; 
Tsoukalas 1993), or the result of interests mediation patterns characterised by 
rent-seeking behaviour of sections enjoying privileges (Lyberaki and 
Tsakalotos 2002; Pagoulatos 2003) is a matter of interpretation. 
The delusion that a matter is sufficiently dealt with because legislation has been 
put in place has implications about the ways in which legislation attempts to 
influence reality; discretion is limited to legal categories. This in the field of 
gender balance further implies that (a) privileges are granted by fiat and (b) 
cash benefits are favoured over provision of social services. The efficiency of 
policy-makers is evaluated by the number of laws they managed to pass. Since 
1974 more than 4000 laws were enacted; to this total must be added 
presidential decrees, ministerial decision and circulars. A predictable side effect 
is over-determination (in the mathematical sense) where conflicting rules apply 
–a frequent cause of administrative paralysis. The administrative ethos 
prevailing is that, if something is not explicitly allowed, it is deemed not to be 
                                                 
13
 Often tautologously, as the problem is defined as the absence of laws. 
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permitted. This frequently provides a useful pretext for the non-implementation 
of laws. 
The Greek legal situation is characterised by a conflict: on the one hand there 
exists a plethora of very detailed, particularistic and frequent overlapping laws. 
On the other, there are stirring declarations of abstract principles and general 
rules – most of which blatantly contravened in particular cases. The system 
embodies severe particularistic fragmentation, yet is, supposedly, governed by 
universal principles. In situations of such conflict, the courts, both domestic 
and European are called to deal with cases of legal discrimination in 
employment and social protection. Faced with this contradiction, any court 
cannot but strike down the discriminatory legislation. These court decisions are 
frequently ignored by the government, and citizens are enjoined to seek redress 
in the courts on an individual basis14. 
The non- implementation of legislation is by no means a new phenomenon in 
Greece. The 19th century writer Roidis wrote: ‘After the deluge of legislation, 
allow me to propose the following single new law: “On the implementation of 
legislation already in force” (Roidis 1952, p14315). Is the case of gender 
equality, then, at all special?  
                                                 
14
 Given the precedent courts are bound to rule in their favour (after the necessary legal delays, legal 
fees etc).  It is not surprising that the majority of citizens choose not to exercise such ‘rights’. Marinos 
et al. (2007) discuss the implications for constitutional reforms of the plethora of legal cases citing that 
particular legislative areas violate the constitution. 
15
 On the role of the courts in employment and social protection, see Kostavara (2006); Petroglou, 
Petroglou and Maniati (1997); Petroglou (2005); Giannakourou and Soumeli (2003); Dermanakakis et 
al. (2002). 
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In responding to that question, ubiquitous and repetitive legislation on gender 
equality was applied and re-applied for a quarter century, with an uneven and 
limited effect. So, legislation has done little to change people’s lives. If the 
ultimate aim of legislation is meaningful change to people’s lives16, then the 
pursuit of gender balance as a social intervention must, even by Greek 
standards of non-implementation, be exceptional for missing the mark. This 
cannot be an accident; we need a systemic explanation to account for it. 
 
4. Explanation: Why were good intentions thwarted? 
Legalistic minded policy-makers, however well meaning, operated with little 
appreciation of the bounds of their ability to influence matters in society. What 
was the implication of this stance? The analysis that follows indicates that the 
shortcomings of this approach explain why the cause of gender equality 
suffered17. 
The superimposition of legalistic formalism to an environment of small family 
run firms meant that: (a) gender equality was imposed only where simple 
legislative fiat was enough (in the state sector) and gender balance could not be 
pursued in the larger part of the economy; (b) employers in small firms were 
never persuaded that gender equality meant more than extra costs, gender 
equality would not be pursued by them in the wider context; finally (c) female 
                                                 
16
 If we define the aim to eradicate all discriminatory mention of gender in legal instruments, then our 
interpretation would be much more sanguine (if somewhat tautologous). 
17
 This section draws heavily from Lyberaki (2009), where the three hypotheses are presented in detail. 
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beneficiaries of protection realised early on that in order to exercise the 
privileges of the protected sector, they had to accept in practice that their 
economic role was subsidiary.  
First hypothesis: Reforms were only applied to the public sector. The 
insiders-outsiders division was reinforced, while the many women outsiders 
were made worse by comparison (Boeri, 2009; Cha & Thebaud, 2009; Estevez-
Abe, 2005; Lyberaki, 2005). 
In the Mediterranean countries the economics of the family create a specific 
policy environment (Bettio and Villa, 1998). In Greece, as elsewhere in the 
Mediterranean, a family-centred welfare system (Matsaganis, 2009) a family-
biased production system (Lyberaki, 2008a) and a family-oriented values 
system (see evidence below) have undermined the liberating potential of 
gender legislation. Large parts of the economy are impenetrable to legislation 
(small family firms, loosely regulated services in private sector, informal 
economy). Only the public sector acted as a “haven for women’s work”, while 
the rest of the economy remained more or less hostile to women’s employment. 
Policy-makers failed to take into account the duality of the productive structure 
and the clear divisions in the labour market between insiders and outsiders. 
Equality policies would have been successful, if women’s employment was 
tantamount to public sector employment. But it was not. Hence, gender 
equality promoting legislation by strengthening the (already more protected) 
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position of women in the public sector had the effect of adding another 
dimension (the dimension of gender) to the insider/outsider divide. 
As a result, the attraction of the public sector to those women who can join its 
ranks is overwhelming, especially for women with secondary education. 
Compared to the small-size private sector, the public sector pays 50% higher 
wages to female employees (Lyberaki 2009). The gender earnings gap has been 
the object of a number of studies since the 1980s, which conclude it has not 
shrunk for 20 years18. Predictably, Figure 3 shows that female employment in 
the public sector increased by 73% for that period. 
An important point to note is that the rise in female employment in the public 
sector did not coincide with a change in the functions served by the public 
sector. This sharply differentiates Greece from the Nordic countries, where the 
increase in female employment coincided with a greater emphasis on social 
services, which was the causal explanation for the increase in public sector 
female employment. Thus, the observation that policies compensate for gender 
inequality in the private sector by creating jobs for women in the public sector 
                                                 
18
 The earliest estimate for the mid-1960s which placed them at around 37% -with discrimination 
accounting for 60% (Kanellopoulos 1982), while for the mid-1970s Psacharopoulos (1983) estimated 
them at 35% (with discrimination accounting for 89% of the gap). A number of studies show that 
gender wage gaps narrowed between 1975 and 1988 (by about 15 percentage points) but remained 
fairly stable ever since (Kanellopoulos, Mavromaras and Mitrakos 2003), if not deteriorating slightly 
(Cholezas and Tsakloglou 2006; Kanellopoulos and Mavromaras 2002). More recent estimates (based 
on data of the late 1990s) vary: Cholezas and Tsakloglou (2006) suggest that the gender earnings gap 
stands at around 25.5% -with discrimination accounting for 70% to 80%, Papapetrou (2004) estimates 
it as 28.8% -with discrimination between 61% and 66%, Karamessini and Ioakimoglou (2003) concur 
with the earnings gap (28.5% in industry and 25% in services) but estimate discrimination as lower. 
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(a point made by Estevez-Abe in 2009) applies with even more force in Greece 
than the Nordic countries19. 
Figure 3 Cumulative percentage change by sector and gender 1985-2006. 
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Source: ILO, Labor Statistics. 
Second hypothesis: Legislation on gender balance was resisted in the 
private sector, while the government’s commitment to enforcing it was 
clearly lacking. Gender balance was not embraced by employers because it 
was superimposed on prevailing conditions by simply expressing the wish that 
employers would shoulder the cost for maternity protection and equality in 
general. To implement the legislation (or at least not to ignore it), private 
employers needed to believe that the implementation of the legislation was 
ultimately to their benefit, as they would not be reimbursed by the State for 
employment protection. An example is equal pay: the issue of equal pay for 
work of equal value never figured properly on the policy implementation 
agenda. The Labour Inspectorates whose job would have been to supervise that 
                                                 
19
 Her point is that “the Nordic countries appear to compensate for gender inequality in the private 
sector by creating jobs for women in the public sector” (Estevez-Abe 2009, 185). A criticism of her 
position is that the increase in female employment was the effect and not the cause of the wider range 
of social services provided by the public sector in the Nordic countries. In Greece no such structural 
shift was evident in the period since 1980. 
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legislation were understaffed and lacked training. On the other hand, the unions 
were interested in cash benefits and pay increases that would go to the entire 
workforce rather than services in kind or time, that would be targeted to 
working women (Dermanakis et al. 2002). In other words, the governments 
turned a blind eye, while their commitment to equality was far from credible 
(Basu et al, 2007). 
The State was faced with the choice of promoting female employment either 
through compensating unwilling employers for the cost imposed or by directly 
providing extended protection to its own employees.  In this dilemma it chose 
the latter course, further reinforcing the insider/outsider divide; it placed its 
hopes for the private sector on voluntary compliance on the part of employers. 
For equality to have a chance, however, employers needed to be convinced of 
the benefits of gender balance. This palpably did not happen:  gender equality 
(despite lip-service) was seen as an imported (Western) idea, clashing with 
indigenous institutions – a point that is apparent in survey evidence examined 
later in this section. The task of persuading the grass roots SMEs to implement 
the law, was ignored and not pursued by the State; formalism implied that 
persuasion was not seen as part of the reform agenda. Lukewarm commitment 
and ‘turning a blind eye’ set the scene for imperfect enforcement. The latter’s 
natural and foreseeable consequence was the delay of the kind of gender 
developments which were proceeding in countries such as Italy and Spain. 
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 Thus, employers (with the tacit agreement or even encouragement of the 
State) would not implement and could simply sidestep the law. 
Small employers were not alone in being resistant to social transformation of 
economic roles. The prevailing values in society at large were and remain 
conservative. “Special treatment of women” (sic) was fine, as long as the State 
paid for it, and as long as certain core female ‘duties’ remained unchallenged.  
According to this interpretation, the family adapted its strategy for 
daughters/wives, by encompassing their employment in the public sector, as 
long as women working there could satisfy three conditions: 
1. They could continue to perform most of their caring functions. 
2. They would be able to take care of their aging spouse in the future via early 
retirement. 
3. They would not compete with male-insiders for a career20. 
What was a legitimate expectation for a daughter entering the public sector was 
not extended as treatment for female employees of small firms. In their case, 
the needs of the small employer in matters such as maternity leave, 
reconciliation of family life etc came before those of the paterfamilias. Women 
working in the private sector were relegated to the status of outsiders, and non-
implementation in the small-size private sector was not even seen as a problem 
to be addressed.  
                                                 
20
 Indeed, some of the features of the civil servants’ pension regulations for women can be interpreted 
as safeguarding those three conditions: e.g. the 15 year-rule for married women, low pension ages 
ensuring that women do not stay long enough to compete for senior jobs.  See Lyberaki 2010b. 
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Cynics might contend that legal formalism evoked the real plight of outsider 
women to cement the privileges of insider women. This kind of hypocrisy 
could be ridiculed by claiming that gender equality rhetoric was a device used 
by insider families to promote the interests of their female members at the 
expense of their private sector female cousins. 
In the preceding argument, societal values which resist change play an 
important part. So, we turn to some indirect evidence from empirical studies of 
values. Europeans, with the exception of Scandinavians are fairly conservative 
when it comes to prioritizing family over employment for women (Table 2). 
The South of Europe (Greece, Spain and Portugal) seems to agree that ‘Men 
should have more right to a job than women when jobs are scarce’. Greece 
stands out by a long way as the most conservative, by believing that women 
should only play the part of the supplementary earner; they should treat their 
work as a luxury and should allow priority to the ‘serious workers’ – the men.  
The fact that men are clearly more conservative than women (the reverse of 
what holds in Spain) could be seen as indirect support of the points made 
earlier about the attitudes of small employers.  
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Table 2 Attitudes towards aspects of gender equality in Europe, 2004 
 A woman should be prepared 
to cut down on paid work for 
the sake of her family 
Men should have more right to 
a job than women when jobs 
are scarce 
 Mothers Fathers Mothers Fathers 
Greece 44.0 48.3 40.5 53.9 
Spain 58.2 51.5 30.3 25.9 
Portugal 74.5 66.9 35.3 35.5 
France 49.2 47.1 22.7 24.6 
Germany 57.9 56.1 19.1 18.8 
Austria 48.3 51.4 18.0 28.2 
Belgium 42.3 31.6 24.6 23.3 
Denmark 18.1 13.0 4.8 2.4 
Netherland
s 
32.1 30.6 14.2 12.5 
Sweden 14.1 13.5 4.3 2.9 
Finland 23.7 22.0 6.7 7.1 
GB 52.1 44.0 16.9 13.7 
Ireland 50.7 36.4 22.2 16.2 
All 50.5 46.1 21.3 20.4 
Source: European Social Survey, 2004 
On closer inspection21 it becomes evident that legislative, demographic and 
economic trends have done little to question the primacy of the family as the 
basic institution of socio-economic life. The percentage of Greeks that state 
they believe that family is the most important thing in life is very high (even 
compared with the Mediterranean), and so is the percentage of people thinking 
that adequate income and good housing constitute very important prerequisites 
for a successful marriage22. In view of the above, the prolonged stay of adult 
children in their parents’ home echoes Bettio and Villa (1998, 130) that 
emancipation in the Mediterranean occurs within rather than outside of the 
family. Emancipation within the family prolongs material comfort for adult 
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 Demographic developments reinforce the conclusion of the continued salience of the family (Bettio 
and Villa 1998; Lyberaki 2009). 
22
 Evidence in this section is drawn from the European Values Survey, carried out in 2000 (published 
2001), which includes Greece in the sample (unlike the earlier waves). 
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offspring, but it hardly encourages the radical transformation of values, 
attitudes and identities. Over 79% of Greeks think that a woman has to have 
children in order to be fulfilled (against 26.4% for men). The response to the 
statement “A pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works” is 
affirmative for 28.1% in Greece (while only 19.6% in Italy, 7.6% in Spain, and 
14.7% in Portugal (European Values Study 2001, 134). Fewer approve and 
twice as many do not approve “of a woman who wants to have a child as a 
single parent without a stable relationship”. 
Third hypothesis: Women were encouraged to think of themselves as 
having a subordinate economic role. Women – especially, but not exclusively 
– in the public sector ‘benefit’ from a range of special regulations. To exercise 
these ‘privileges’ women need to sign off from aspiring to a full career, most 
often through early retirement or by forgoing positions of responsibility. By 
internalising thus the subsidiary role for women, they are galvanized into a 
major force preventing change, in the interests of defending their ‘privileges’. 
The difficulties arising out of the asymmetric coverage of equality promoting 
legislation could have been compensated via the provisions of the social 
security system. The latter can, in theory at least, fill the gaps of legislation 
enforcement. However, the Social protection system, far from compensating 
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for dualism, reinforces it and serves as a mechanism for the promotion of 
particularistic interests23. 
These divisions are clearly reflected in the diversity of women’s position: a 
dual picture of women’s life chances. Women in the protected sphere (civil 
servants and public utilities employees, professionals- lawyers, doctors and 
engineers) appear to be improving their lot. The majority of working women 
(those employed in smaller firms, those moving in and out of employment, new 
entrants into the labour market, informal sector activities and the non-
professional self-employed) are faced with uncertainties, risks and 
vulnerability.  
The social insurance system reflects the social conditions of its inception -the 
1930s. Numerous attempts to reform it were stalled or at best produced only 
piecemeal ‘parametric’ changes, keeping the broad structure of the system 
stable (Tinios 2009).  The system from the point of view of gender equality 
remains:  discriminatory, divisive (in the sense of prioritising the interests of 
some women) and patriarchal (in the sense of resting on assumptions 
concerning the dependent nature of women’s roles and their prime 
responsibility as home-makers). Timid “reform by instalments” (Tinios 2005) 
generates fierce resistance from the insiders without empowering sufficiently 
                                                 
23
 The fragmentation of the system implies that social solidarity is contained within occupational 
groups (Börsch-Supan and Tinios 2001; Tinios 2003). Thus the social protection system far from 
alleviating inequalities may have exactly the opposite effect. For its treatment of women see 
Matsaganis and Petroglou (2001). 
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the outsiders, while leaving the implicit assumptions of social protection 
unchallenged. 
Attempts to reform the labour market have had a similar patchy history. Some 
realized that over-regulation arrested mobility and productivity to the detriment 
of jobs creation at large (Burtless 2001). Faced with a situation whereby 
insiders are well protected, while outsiders are left to fend for themselves, the 
reaction was to infuse some flexibility at the margins of the labour market, 
without jeopardizing the interests of the insiders.  This reaction is not only met 
in Greece: Sala, Silva and Toledo (2009) examine this strategy in the OECD 
context, while Boeri (2009) looks at Spain. The labour market remains a two-
tier structure, where outsiders bear the full brunt of adjustment with little social 
assistance. Outsiders are persuaded to support and defend the system which 
excludes them, in the hope that, one day, their own boat will come in, and they 
will be able to join in the benefits or that the benefits will be ‘equalised 
upwards’24 (Tinios 2005; Lyberaki 2008b).  
Recapitulating, ‘equality protection’ (sic) policies were enforced for the 
insiders. Measures in the wider economy were (in theory) to be financed 
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 The recent tragic event concerning the violent homicidal attack against Konstantina Kouneva, (an 
immigrant activist organising contract cleaning workers), brought attention to working conditions for 
contract cleaners. The reaction of most commentators was to conclude that all cleaning should be done 
by permanent civil servants, hence, abolishing the option of contract cleaning and possibly relegating 
all women working currently in the cleaning business to unemployment (INE/GSEE -Labour Institute 
of the General Confederation of Greek Workers 2009). 
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unilaterally by employers. They in turn passed the costs on to women who 
found it increasingly difficult to get hired and pursue meaningful careers25.  
The implicit assumption at the back of the reformers’ mind was that a “normal 
job” has to be identical to a public sector job, the labour market is taken to be 
similar to State employment, and the economy is understood in terms of a 
government bureaucracy. This image is entirely consistent with a world-view 
inspired by legalistic formalism. Myopia of this kind has been driven by the 
characteristics of the protagonists of the public dialogue: public sector trade 
unions, large public utilities unions, banks’ unions (formerly public), 
politicians with an eye to be re-elected and large private sector business 
representatives who tend to be insulated from competition… These players 
showed little interest in what happens to the outsiders26. Some women 
benefited from this deal, but the majority of women did not27.  
The essence of the explanation lies in the joint effect of three Greek features: A 
production structure composed of, on the one hand, an overgrown public sector 
together with satellite large private firms, and an archipelago of small family 
business on the other; an administration of very limited capabilities; a political 
class committed to the rhetoric of gender equality, yet at the same time wary of 
                                                 
25
 The point that the incidence of a tax is distributed according to elasticities – or relative bargaining 
power- and that women would largely bear the cost of their own ‘equality protection’ can be met in any 
economics textbook (e.g. Borjas 2002). It is conspicuously missing in Greek discussions on social 
protection… 
26
 A similar point although in a totally different context is raised by Mandel and Shalev (2009, 177) 
when they conclude that “different configurations of economic models and welfare regimes are more 
noteworthy for their effects on women-within-classes, than on women as a whole” (emphasis added). 
27
 Although making up 40% of wage employees, over the last twenty years there are only three women 
in the TUC Steering Committee comprising 45 members (6.7% in spite of the pro-equality rhetoric) 
(Matsaganis 2009).   
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disturbing established interests.28 The contradictions were solved by the simple 
expedient of pursuing appearance at the expense of substance –a natural 
reaction in a political system reared in legalism and formality29. Gender 
equality was loudly proclaimed, generously subsidized and effectively 
undermined. 
 
5. Conclusions: The perils of legalistic formalism 
The moral of the story told in this paper is that seeing gender equality through 
legalistic eyes distorts. Equality is conceived through a patriarchal viewpoint, 
as an incremental process. It was seen as “a thing” that can be patched on by an 
act of legislative will. It was further implicitly believed that “women could be 
let in” without substantially changing anything, or allowing for new roles. As a 
result, old structures are not changed and women are seen as mere guests: 
pampered yet denied stakes. 
To pursue labour balance meaningfully in Greece would have meant dealing 
seriously with a number of unresolved issues and dilemmas: rigid labour 
                                                 
28
 In evaluating gender concepts in EU policies, Stratigaki (2004, 34) argues that the original feminist 
policy goals became obscured in order to accommodate other policy priorities. She claims that this is a 
process of cooptation, whereby the content of key feminist concepts became gradually transformed due 
to their subordination to different policy priorities; by doing so, they lost their potential for changing 
gender relations. Ironically, a similar process characterised the diffusion of gender policy rhetoric in the 
Greek context. Nevertheless, here the goal (ulterior motive) was not the introduction of flexibility or 
the expansion of female employment, but rather the opposite: to block any meaningful reforms in the 
labour market (that would create jobs and offer choice to women), and to secure privileges for the 
insiders. 
29
 A similar point has been recently raised by Weiner (2009, 320) when she argues that while policies 
and institutions may become global “this does not mean that they will become local”, as insufficient 
heed to domestic conditions “can result in a breach between policy adoption and 
implementation/enforcement”. 
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markets and the insider/outsider dichotomy; the problem of non-
implementation of legislation; the attempt to exhibit progressive social policy 
without shouldering the public finance cost of so doing; embracing ‘modernity’ 
for its own sake and not simply as the appendage of “EU Community Support”. 
Nevertheless, gender balance is more than a simple victim of the generalised 
Greek public policy malaise.  
Policy-makers in the field of gender equality in Greece believed that to 
safeguard gender equality and to vouchsafe their progressive credentials, it was 
sufficient to pass the appropriate legislation. They would simply follow the 
blue-print of what was seen to be the “canon” in Europe, without bothersome 
details of local implementation. However, their good intentions did not suffice 
to guarantee good results.  
The gender equality agenda was seen by the 1980s proponents to take place 
largely in the field of symbolism. Symbols historically are very important for 
the feminist movement: the early suffragettes treated the vote as a symbol; 
second wave feminists realised abortion laws had wider significance as 
restoring woman’s control of her body30. Hence to denigrate legalistic 
formalism for not encompassing economic theory may be thought to be beside 
the point. However, this line of criticism is not very apposite in the Greek case. 
The ideological battle has been ‘formally’ won, at least if one looks at the legal 
armoury and the party manifesta. If anything there seems to be an inflation and 
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 On the use of symbols see Della Porta and Diani (2006, section 4.4.2), and also Williams (2004). 
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depreciation of symbols. What needs to happen is to take the victory to the 
grass roots- i.e. to show the relevance of the legislation to everyday lives.  
In Greece formalism has acted as an “effective mechanism for maintaining the 
status quo because particularistic interests are hidden behind the formalistic 
debates much more than in the West… Formalism is a manifestation of a 
serious disarticulation between imported and indigenous politico-ideological 
institutions” (Mouzelis 1978). Indeed, it is natural for legal formalism, when 
faced with a mismatch between intentions and results, to attempt correction 
through enacting new laws – i.e. more legal formalism. This self-fulfilling 
prophecy has been paralleled to a bureaucratic spiral.  When faced with any 
individual problem, it is always possible to ascribe it to an explanation that 
itself requires more regulation. All these matters provide sufficient explanations 
for any isolated failure –the kind of explanation that is favoured by most 
political commentators. However, repeated failures of the same kind in the 
same issue over protracted periods of time require analyses that venture beyond 
the surface to seek more systematic explanations –to search for necessary 
explanations in order to avoid the particularities of sufficient ones.  
The case of gender equality is a case of repeated failure despite being 
mainstreamed as part of political correctness. To add to the general case, 
gender roles involve the core of personal experience and identities and are 
therefore protected by scores of unseen defence mechanisms. It is these 
mechanisms that must ultimately explain the persistent failures –despite the 
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good intentions and the flowery rhetoric. Indeed, it was the rhetoric that led the 
chase of more and more formalistic initiatives, at the expense of the drudgery 
of actually coming to grips with a complex and resilient reality based on deep-
seated social norms. Legalistic formalism was content to bypass the real issues 
and to create an imagined sphere where gender equality could be proclaimed; 
that bastion could then be exploited as yet another dimension of the 
insider/outsider divide. 
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